










Managing Migration through Conflicting Policies: 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2731 
CATEGORY 4: LABOUR MARKETS 
JULY 2009 
 





An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Managing Migration through Conflicting Policies: 





Recent European legislation on immigration has revealed a particular paradox on migration 
policies. On the one hand, the trend of recent legislation points to the increasing closure of 
frontiers (OECD 1999, 2001,2004), trying to limit the immigrants’ stock. On the other hand, 
there is an increase in regularization, i.e., European policies are becoming less tight. Our aim 
here is to develop a theoretical model that tries to explain if it is better for the government to 
tighten or relax limits for immigrants in order to control migration inflows better. To this end, 
we use a real option approach to migration choice that assumes that the decision to migrate 
can be described as an irreversible investment decision. In our model the government has in 
mind a specific upper bound on immigrants, and the policies adopted (admission requirements 
or regularizations) are signals for each potential migrant that reveal information about this 
limit. Our results show that promoting uncertainty over this migration upper bound may 
improve the government’s control on migration inflows (quotas). This could explain that the 
paradox of counterbalancing policies is not an odd evidence. In particular, we show that if the 
government controls the information related to the immigration stock it could delay the mass 
entry of immigrants, maintaining the required stock in the long run and controlling the flows 
in the short-run. 
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July 20, 2009 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although barriers to international trade and capital mobility have been largely
removed, labour markets are still the most tightly regulated areas of economic
activity (Faini et al., 1999). In this regard, Boeri and Brücker (2005), studying
European migration, showed that rules for legal immigration into the EU from
third countries are getting tighter and tighter: "since 1990 there have been 92
reforms of national migration policies into the EU-15, that is, more than ﬁve
reforms per year. Most of these reforms are marginal in that they adjust speciﬁc
provisions rather than revising the overall regulatory framework. Furthermore,
seven reforms out of ten tighten regulations, for example, by increasing proce-
dural obstacles faced by those applying for visas, reducing the duration of work
permits or making family reuniﬁcation more diﬃcult", or by introducing an im-
migration quota system1. In particular, this latter immigration policy has been
adopted by certain European countries (Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, Spain, UK) to control migration inﬂows better, and it was suggested at the
meeting of the EU Justice and Home Aﬀairs ministers in Stratford-upon-Avon
in late October 2006 2. Nevertheless, despite this evidence, another aspect re-
lated to migration policy has revealed a peculiar paradox of migration policies.
Since 1990, there have been 26 (39 since 1973) one-shot regularization programs
in 10 EU countries (Jachimowicz et al., 2004; Sunderhaus, 2007)3. Therefore,
on the one hand, as a result of increased labour market competition and con-
cerns about terrorism, the trend of recent legislation on immigration points to
the increased closure of frontiers (OECD 1999, 2001). On the other hand, there
are more regolarization programs which, as anticipated by the immigrants, re-
duce the control over the total quantity of immigrants admitted and make the
European policies less tight.
What, therefore, is the eﬀect of this ambiguity concerning European migra-
tion policies? Is it better to tighten or to relax limits on the migration stocks?
As many countries have adopted simultaneously two kinds of conﬂicting immi-
gration policies, it seems, at ﬁrst glance, that the legislator has no clear idea
about the matter. Moreover, this uncertainty reduces information about the
migration stocks accepted in each country by the authorities: this entails that
potential immigrants do not exactly know whether or not the ceiling is binding.
Our aim in this paper is to answer these questions, by investigating the con-
ﬂicting immigration policies in European immigration legislation in an uniﬁed
framework.
By using a recent approach to migration choice, which assumes that the deci-
sion to migrate can be described as an investment decision (Sjaastad, 1962), we
approach the above question by extending recent results obtained by Bartolini4
(1993; 1995). Bartolini shows that a competitive market reacts to limit5 aggre-
gate investment by generating recurrent runs as the total investment approaches
its ceiling. That is, the existence of limit on aggregate investment may induce
endogenous and recurrent asset runs so that the stock limits are immediately
ﬁlled. Speciﬁcally, the aggregate investment evolves smoothly over time, driven
by market conditions, until it reaches an upper threshold where it shows a jump
that ﬁlls the stock.
We show that, introducing uncertaintyc o n c e r n i n gt h es t o c ko fi m m i g r a n t s
allowed to enter in a competitive migration market, the entry run tends to van-
ish. Because each agent is not able to perfectly foresee the true upper limit, he
acts as if the limit did not exist. The entry process tends to be smooth and has
no jumps. The ambiguity concerning the true limit reduces the entry runs by
potential immigrants, allowing the government to obtain, in the long run, the
required immigration stock and to control ﬂow in the short-run (i.e., the migra-
2tion quota accepted each year). In this context, the presence of regularization
programs that make agents unable to perfectly foresee the limit is no longer a
paradox, but it may be useful for the planner to control immigration inﬂow.
This paper is related to past research that applies the real option approach
to migration phenomena. In this regard, Burda (1995), showed that individuals
prefer to wait before migrating, even if the present value of the wage diﬀeren-
tial is positive, because of the uncertainty and the sunk costs associated with
migration. Subsequently Khwaja (2002) and Anam et al., (2007) developed
Burda’s approach by describing the role of uncertainty in the migration deci-
sion. Another work that uses real option on migration is Feist (1998), in which
the author analyses the option value for low-skilled workers of escaping to the
unoﬃcial sector if welfare beneﬁts come too close to the net wage in the oﬃcial
sector. Three recent papers (Moretto and Vergalli, 2008; Vergalli, 2007; Ver-
galli, 2008) have applied the real option framework to the analysis of migration
dynamics, focussing on the role of communities and network in explaining mass
migration.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper, we describe what happens in migration dy-
namics if the authority gives total information about the target number of im-
migrants it has in mind. This assumption means that the government adopts a
policy in only one direction: in particular, it imposes a determined and known
limit over the stock on the immigration entries and this ceiling is known to all
the potential immigrants. In the second part, we show that the introduction
of noise over the limit delays mass entry (i.e., ﬂows). This uncertainty can be
created either by announcing policies followed by diﬀerent action by the govern-
ment or by introducing diﬀerent policies relaxing or tightening the conditions
to immigrate. In both cases this uncertainty may also depend on governments
with unstable majorities, that probably is expressed in counterbalancing migra-
tion policies6. This fact may also explain why recent legislation on immigration
has moved in the two counterbalancing directions explained above. The re-
sult is that in this case, the migration inﬂow becomes smooth regardless of the
particular policy adopted.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the evolution of
national immigration policies. Section 3 presents the model and the basic as-
sumptions. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework with a known upper
limit on immigrants. Section 5 develops the theoretical framework with un-
known limit over the stock and gets out the main results. Section 6 summarises
the conclusions. Finally, the Appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
2 Evolution in National Immigration Policies
Immigration policies can be tightened by using diﬀerent criteria. In this regard,
Boeri and Brücker (2005) developed an aggregate policy index that describes
"the trend in migration policies". The index is shown in Figure 1 and is ob-
tained by taking the average of the following seven indicators: 1) admission
requirements; 2) number of administrations involved; 3) length of ﬁrst stay; 4)
quotas; 5) residence requirement; 6) years to obtain a permanent permit; 7) asy-
lum policy7. According to Boeri and Brücker’s analysis national immigration
policies are becoming tighter8.
3Figure 1: Boeri and Brücker immigration policy index. Comparison between
1990 and 2005
In order to study policies of this kind in depth, in table 1 we show the
European countries that have recently introduced immigration quota systems,
being Austria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom9. As table 1 shows, many European
countries plan to spread quotas over several years (i.e. three/two-period quota
for France, Spain and Czech Republic). Since a quota is deﬁned as "a share of
the total immigrants allowed to enter the host country", this means that the
governments use year quotas to distribute the total stock of immigrants they
have programmed over some years.
4Country  Quota  Source 
Austria  •  In 1990, a quota for the employment of foreigners was introduced, defined as 
a maximum share of foreign workers in the total workforce. 
•  The Residence Act 1993 has the objective to control immigration . It defines 
the quantitative and qualitative criteria for the potential residence of different 
groups of foreigners: definition of quotas for certain sub-groups of 
immigrants (family members). 
•  The Aliens Law 1997 (Fremdengesetz ) came into effect in 1998. It regulates 
the conditions for entry and residence in the country. The key concept of the 
reform is: "Integration Before New Immigration". Reduction of immigration 
quotas. 
•  The Aliens Law 2002 changes the conditions of entry and residence in the 
country, it provides for a stricter system of immigration control and it tightens 
the quota system. Key professional are not subject to quotas, don't have to 
fulfill the integration agreement and can obtain a residence permit with the 
authorization to work. 
 
Federal Ministry for Internal Affairs,  
Migration Information Source,  
European Migration Network,  
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 
Czech 
Republic 
•  The Czech government launched in 2002 a pilot programme for the active 
selection of the qualified foreign workers. The quotas were established for the 
first two years – 600 and 1200 persons for 2003 and 2004 respectively 
OECD 
France  •  In 2006, the government has been required to submit to parliament an annual 
report specifying the number and kind of residency permits to be authorized 
over a three-year period. The draft bill avoids using the word "quotas," but 
critics say the provision amounts to a quota-system”. 
•  In 2007 the government decided to adopt decrees on immigration quotas “by 
profession, category and, naturally, by regions of the world” 
Work Permits 
Greece  •  The Law 1975/1991 defines for the  first time the legal situation of migrants 
and refugees. It's an attempt to modernize the relevant legislation on issues of 
entrance, exit, stay, settlement, employment and expulsion of aliens.  
•  The Law 2910/2001 reorganizes the procedure concerning work permits: the 
Manpower Employment Organization at the end of every year prepares a report 
recording the current needs in Greek labour market, a resolution based on this 
report shall set forth the maximum number of work permits to be granted every 
year. 
European Migration Network 
Italy  •  The Law 39/1990 (Martelli Law) regulates the entry and the residence of non-
EU citizens: migration begins to be considered as a stable phenomenon. The 
law defines the conditions to grant entry permits for working reasons: the 
Government has to draw up a yearly plan instead of referring to pre-defined 
criteria. This is the first law that bruits the idea of quotas. 
•  With ministry of Employment’s decree 15 February 2006, were defined the 
non-EU immigrant quotas. 
European Migration Network, 
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 





Portugal  •  The Decree-Law 34/2003 introduces a system of quotas to regulate the entry of 
migrants. Every year, depending on economic and labour market condition, the 
maximum number of foreigners allowed to enter the country is fixed by the 
Government. 
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 
Slovenia  •  The Employment and Work of Aliens Act is the main act regulating the 
economic migration in Slovenia. It sets the policy priorities as well as the 
maximum quotas of admitted workers 
OECD 
Spain  •  The quota system is the basic mechanism used in managing the labour 
immigration in Spain. 
It was used in the years 1993-1995, 1997-1999 and since 2002. The aim of the 
quotas was to direct the immigrants to the labour market sectors which suffered 
from shortages. 
Migration Information Surce, 
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 
Sopemi - OECD 
Switzerland  •  The Swiss government relaxed its immigration laws on 01 June 2007. Quotas 
will remain in place for these countries until at least 2011. The previous system 
allowed 15,000 permanent residence permits to be granted annually for people 
who had a job contract for more than one year. This quota was quickly 
exhausted each year. Short term permits, allocated at 115,000 per year, were 




For unskilled workers: 
•  Working Holiday Makers – around 46,000 young people from 
Commonwealth countries (17-27 years old) are allowed to come to Britain 
and take up non-professional job for up to 2 years; 
•  seasonal agricultural workers – for students, mainly form Central and Eastern 
Europe, who arrive within a set quota (Food Manufacturing Fish and Meat 
sector in the context of Sector Based Scheme Pemits); 
•  Au pairs – around 15,000 per annum; 
•  Domestic workers – around 15,000 per annum (Spencer 2002). 
Work Permits, World Bank, OECD 
 
Table 1: immigration quota system adopted in some countries
To be complete in the analysis of migration policies, we must also add an-
other instrument that governments can use to control migration: regularization
programs which, by deﬁnition, relax the eﬀect of limits on the stock and at
the same time modify immigrant ﬂows and stocks. Hence, inspections at Euro-
pean legislation (see Figure 1 and table 1), show that several countries impose
both admission requirements and quotas to reduce entry. Nevertheless, they
also adopt frequent regularization programs. Table 2 shows the regularization
programs adopted in Europe since 197310. Since 1990, there have been 26 (39
since 1973) one-shot regularization programs in 10 EU countries.
5Country  Regularizations  Years 
Belgium  3  1974-1975, 1995-1999, 2000 
France  5  1973, 1979, 1981-1982, 1991, 1997-1998 
Germany  2  1996, 1999 
Greece  2 1997-1998,  2001 
Italy  6  1982, 1987-1988, 1990, 1996, 1998-1999, 2002 
Luxembourg  1 2001 
Netherlands  5  1964, 1975, 1978-1979, 1991-1994, 1996 
Portugal  3  1992-1993, 1996, 2001 
Spain  7  1985-1986, 1991, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2005 
United Kingdom  5  1974-1978, 1977, 1987, 1998-1999, 2004 
Total  39  
 
Table 2: Regularization Programs in 10 EU countries.
There is no doubt that all these seven policies mirror European immigration
policy. Nevertheless, for some of these policies we should distinguish between
short and long term also among their eﬀects on migration ﬂows and/or migration
stocks. For example, consider what happens when a government has in mind
a given target for the total number of immigrants that should enter and it
announces immigration policies that tighten the admission requirements (this
can be done by exacerbating some of the indicators shown above). This policy
announcement reveals whether or not the immigrant stock is close to its upper
limit. Therefore, if there is a tightening of migration policies, the potential
immigrants believe that the "open door" of migration is closing and they may
decide to run to enter. We thus have two counterbalencing eﬀects of a migration
limit: on the one hand the limits may be able to control migration stocks in
the long run (if the authority does not change the target stock by relaxing the
ceilings afterwards), on the other hand it may trigger run-entry mechanisms
that may thwart any control of inﬂow and its speed. That is, limits on the
stock are useful for controlling, at least in the long run, the total number of
immigrants (stock) but not the entry speed (ﬂow). In particular in the EU
there has been a tightening of immigration policies supported by the increase
of immigration quotas. Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger when the limit on the
stock is perceived by immigrants as their last chance to enter: they all hurry to
enter the host country.
3 The Model
3.1 The basic assumptions
For simplicity, the model uses the familiar terminology of an agents’ entry deci-
sions under uncertainty11. Consider the immigration decision of individuals in
a host country subject to an uncertain wage gap. Let us summarize the main
assumptions:
1. At any time t, a potential immigrant may decide to migrate ("entry").
Individuals are risk-neutral and discount future income at the constant
discount rate ρ.
2. Each individual can migrate by committing irrevocably to a ﬂow cost w
or undertaking a single irreversible investment which requires an initial
sunk cost K = w/ρ.
63. nt is the number of individuals in the host country at time t, each yields
an e t 12 ﬂow of income13:
π(θt,n t) ≡ u(nt)θt (1)
where θ is a multiplicative labour market-speciﬁcs h o c k .W ec a nc o n s i d e r ,
in a simpler setting, u(nt) as the inverse demand function (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, ch. 9; Bartolini, 1993; Nielsen, 2002) or as a reduced form
of a more general beneﬁt function (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch. 11; Dixit,
1995; Grenadier, 2002; Moretto and Vergalli 2008). Time is continuous,
t ∈ [0,∞), and suppressed if not necessary.
4. The function u(n) is continuously diﬀerentiable in n with the usual prop-
erties.
u(n) > 0,u 0(n) < 0
lim
n→0
u(n)=+ ∞ and lim
n→ ¯ N
u(n)=u > 0
where ¯ N ≤∞ can be interpreted as the upper saturation level of the
ethnic community in the host country14. Hence, a positive reserve "utility"
u means that for each immigrant the beneﬁts from migration (even in the
worst case) are higher than the costs (in the wider sense) of migrating.15
5. All individuals are identical and their size dnt is inﬁnitesimally small with
respect to the labour market in the host country.
6. The labour market-speciﬁc shock follows a geometric diﬀusion process16:
dθt = αθtdt + σθtdWt with θ0 = θ and α,σ > 0 (2)
where α<ρand dWt is the increment to a Wiener process, satisfying
E(dWt)=0and Va r(dWt)=dt17.
In the next section, we assume that the limit on the stock is known to the
immigrants. The existence of a ceiling on the aggregate level of migration in-
duces an externality among the beneﬁt functions of diﬀerent immigrants, which
causes a possible divergence between the socially-optimal and proﬁt-maximizing
policies. Then, in section 4 we relax this assumption by assuming that the im-
migrants may not know the true stock.
3.2 Solution when the upper limit on the total immigrants
is known
For the ﬁr s tr e s u l tw eh a v ea d d e dt h ef o l l o w i n ga s s u m p t i o n :
7. There exists an exogenously determined limit on the stock N<¯ N on n,
which is announced by the government and is known to all the potential
immigrants.
To determine the migrant’s optimal entry policy, the ﬁrst thing to do is to ﬁnd
his/her value, given each individual’s optimal future entry policy. Let us
consider the value of an immigrant V (θ,n,N), who is active in the market,
as the expected discounted stream of income:




e−ρtπ(θt,n t)dt − J[t=τ]K | n0 = n, θ0 = θ
¸
(3)
7where J[t=τ] is the indicator function and the expectation is taken consid-
ering that the number of active immigrants may change over time because
of new entry. The solution to (3) can be obtained by starting within a
time interval in which no new entry occurs. Over this interval the num-
ber of immigrants n is ﬁxed and V (θ,n,N) must satisfy the no-arbitrage
requirement18 where time is suppressed if not necessary:
π(θ,n)+E[dV (θ,n,N)/dt]=ρV (θ,n,N) (4)
Assuming V (θ,n,N) to be a twice-diﬀerentiable function with respect to θ
and using Itô’s Lemma to expand dV (θ,n,N), the solution of (3) is given by
the following diﬀerential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 179-180):19
1
2
σ2Vθθ (θ,n,N)+αVθ (θ,n,N) − ρV (θ,n,N)+π (θ,n)=0 (5)











represents the value of migration in the absence
of new entry20.T h e nB (n,N)θ
β is the correction of the migration’s value due
to the new entry and B (n,N) must therefore be negative. Obviously, a last
boundary condition applies to the value of the Nth entry. The value of the
Nth entry should converge to the value of a migration calculated by keeping the
number of immigrants ﬁxed at N, i.e. V (θ,n,N)=
θu(N)
ρ−α . This implies that:
B (N,N)=0 . (7)
If the beneﬁt value function (6) is known, the optimal migration policy
implies that the return from migration must be at least equal to cost K at
the entry point. In other words, we need to ﬁnd the trigger value θ
∗ (n) (i.e.
the value of the labour demand shock) at which the nth migrant is indiﬀerent
between immediate entry or waiting another instant. This trigger should be
calculated bearing in mind that N is the upper limit and that above this limit
no new entry is allowed.21 This is deﬁned in the following proposition:









for n=( 0 ,n ∗] (8)
θ
∗(n∗)=θ
∗(N) for n=[ n∗,N] (9)
where θ
∗(N)=( ρ − α) K
u(N).
Proof. See Bartolini (1993) and the Appendix.
By Proposition 1, the entry policy is eﬃcient until a number n∗ <Nof
individuals has entered the market. At that point a migration run takes place
and the residual stock is instantly ﬁlled. As proved by Bartolini (1993), n∗ is
determined by the fact that it splits the interval (0,N] into two subintervals. In
the ﬁrst interval, the individuals enter by following the usual matching value and
smooth pasting conditions, i.e. V (θ




dn > 0 (see the Appendix) ; in the second interval, the individuals
8migrate by a "run" until the whole stock is instantly ﬁlled, i.e.
dθ∗(n)
dn =0 ,







The insights from Proposition 1 are shown in Figure 2, below. In particular:
i) In the ﬁrst quadrant on the left, on the abscissa, stands the entry value for
diﬀerent θ and n levels. The migration value of the ﬁrst n∗ immigrants
follows the S-shaped curve typical of the model of investment hysteresis
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 220). These curves are tangential to the
barrier (i.e., the entry cost) K and describe the value of migration as long
as it ﬂuctuates under the K level. The last (N − n∗)c u r v e sc r o s st h e
level K,a n da l lo ft h e mm u s tc r o s sK at the same level of fundamentals
θ.22 Whenever V (θ,n,N) reaches K, the number of immigrants increases,
shifting the current curve rightwards. When n reaches n∗, a large change
in n shifts the current curve from V (θ,n∗,N) to V (θ,N,N).
ii) The second quadrant on the right shows the threshold levels for diﬀerent
numbers of immigrants. Below or to the right of the curve no migration
occurs because at a given level θ(n) <θ
∗ (n), the beneﬁtf o re a c hp o t e n t i a l
immigrant is lower than the cost of migrating. This means that above the
curve it is optimal to migrate. A wave of migrants will enter in a lump
to move the beneﬁt level immediately to the threshold curve. In the
region below the curve the optimal policy is inaction. But the shock can
cross the trigger for diﬀerent numbers of individuals, n. To appreciate
the explanation of Figure 1, let us consider a sequential entry starting at
n<n ∗. If the initial size of the community is n<n ∗, we can expect
migration to work in the following way. For any ﬁxed n, if the beneﬁts
climb to a certain level π∗ = u(n)θ
∗(n), migration becomes feasible, the
network size increases from n to n + dn and the beneﬁts go downwards
along the function u(n).23 If the size of the community is n∗ ≤ n ≤ N,
when the shock hits the threshold θ
∗(n), then the stock is instantaneously
ﬁlled and a mass (N − n) of individuals enter and the beneﬁts climb to
π∗ = u(N)θ
∗(N). Therefore, until n∗ the individuals migrate in a smooth
manner, but between n∗ and N they enter in a mass because for (N−n∗),
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Figure 2: Optimal threshold levels with known stock N
Summarizing, with free entry, labour market competition generates a run that
ﬁlls the stock when a fraction n∗/N has been ﬁlled. Until then, the entry policy
is identical to the case without a limit. Immigrants initially enter at the optimal
pace, knowing that all the potential beneﬁts will dissipate by the early entry of
the last (N − n∗) individuals.
4 Solution when the upper limit on total immi-
grants is unknown
S of a rw eh a v ea n a l y s e dt h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yw i t haﬁxed-known limit on the stock
of the number of individuals admitted to the host country. But what happens if
the limit is perceived to be uncertain by immigrants? To introduce uncertainty
on the limit, we replace assumption (7) with the following assumption:
7b i s .Each individual does not know the exact limit on the stock imposed
by the government 24. However he/she knows that the limit is con-
tinuously distributed and drawn from a common distribution function
F(N)=P r ( N <N ) which is strictly increasing in the interval [0, ¯ N],
where ¯ N is the upper support of the distribution of N, and it has a con-
tinuous diﬀerentiable density f(N)25.
Further, we assume that each individual makes rational conjectures about
the distribution of N over time. More speciﬁcally, as new individuals decide
to migrate, the individual will update his/her conjecture about Pr(N <N ).
As time goes by and n increases, the potential immigrant learns that the
probabilty of hitting the limit is higher. The individual then observes the
realization of the state variable n and updates his/her conjecture by using
G(N;n)=P r ( N <N) |N>n )=
F(N)−F(n)
1−F(n) which is strictly increasing in
the interval [n,∞), with density g(N;n)=
f(N)
1−F(n).
Since the individuals now do not know the true limit, the value of their
decision cannot be deﬁned by (6). In particular, the last boundary condition (7)




E (B (n)) = 0 (11)
10where the expectation operator is taken with respect to the random variable N .
As before, also in this case, we should ﬁnd the threshold level θ
∗ (n) that
corresponds to the optimal entry process. Taking condition (11) into account,
we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The beneﬁt-maximizing entry policy in a market with an un-
















for all n>n ∗∗ (13)
where n∗ <n ∗∗.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that the entry policy is eﬃcient until a number n∗∗ of
immigrants has entered the market. At that point, a migration run starts until
the true (unknown) stock is reached. That is, since the true limit is unknown,
the migration run continues until the government stops entries because the
predeﬁned limit has been reached. In addition, it is evident from (12) and (13)
it is evident that the optimal trigger n∗∗ is obtained by considering all supports
of the distribution F(N), i.e., each individual acts as if the limit does not exist







nally, by direct inspection of (10) and (14), it is immediate obvious that n∗∗ >n ∗
as long as u(N) >u .
To interprete these results, consider Figure 3. In particular, in the quadrant
on the left we have the value of the immigrants on the horizontal axis and the
threshold level on the vertical axis. In the quadrant on the right, we have the
threshold level on the vertical axis, and the number of immigrants in the host
country on the horizontal axis. The red line represents the optimal trigger as
a function of the number of immigrants. By comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3,
we can see that while, without uncertainty, the optimal threshold level ﬂattens
at n∗, under uncertainty the competitive run starts at n∗∗ >n ∗ and continues
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Figure 3: Optimal threshold levels with unknown stock
Therefore, if diﬀerent political parties alternate in the government of a coun-
try, they probably express diﬀerent and conﬂicting migration policies. This
ambiguity, concerning the tightening (by exacerbating quotas or admission re-
quirements) or the relaxing (by using regularization programs) of the limit on
stocks, may increase especially in countries with unstable majorities. The result
is that, in this case, the migration inﬂow becomes smooth independently of the
particular policy adopted.
A policy remark about this result is in order. Comparing the two rules







which means that the ratio between n∗∗ and n∗, does not depend on the dis-
tribution of the stock F(N) but only on the ratio between u and u(N).I fb y
adopting repeated regularization programs a country is able to generate noise
over the true limit N, and to instill the idea in immigrants that the labour mar-
ket’s saturation level may increase, the entry jump is moved forward. That is,
the entry run happens at a higher size n∗∗, corresponding to a higher beneﬁt
level u(n∗∗)θ
∗(n∗∗), which means that the stock is fulﬁlled later. In other words,
if the government’s goal is to delay migration waves and smooth entries, it can
do so by controlling information on the immigration stock.
5T h e e ﬀect of labour market uncertainty
Our model allows for deeper study of the eﬀect of uncertainty concerning labour
demand on entry policy as well as on the optimal triggers n∗ and n∗∗.F r o m












12As anticipated by the Real Option Theory, an increase in the labour demand
volatility (σ) increases the
β
β−1 ratio which, in turn, raises the threshold of θ
∗ (n)
for any given number of immigrants n. In this sense, greater uncertainty implies
less willingness to migrate. However, as shown by (17), greater uncertainty
magniﬁes the competitive eﬀect, reducing the size that triggers the entry run.
Therefore, depending on what kinds of eﬀect prevail, we may get two entry
patterns, as shown in Figure 4.27 If the uncertainty eﬀect is soft, then the
deriving competition eﬀect, from a decrease in the crucial level n∗∗0 <n ∗∗
is stronger than the entry delay caused by the raising of the threshold level
(lower bold dotted line in ﬁgure). Entry is pushed forward because of the
decrease of competition and, although we observe a reduction in immigration
ﬂow, the average time taken to reach the government’s predeﬁned limit can be
substantially reduced. On the contrary, if the eﬀect of uncertainty is strong, the
time delay of migration entry (higher bold dotted line in ﬁgure) is stronger than
the reduction of competition: in this cas et h e r ei sar e d u c t i o ni nm i g r a t i o ni n ﬂow






































Figure 4. Undetermined limit over the stock: threshold levels for increasing
variance
6C o n c l u s i o n
Recent European legislation on immigration reveals a peculiar paradox on mi-
gration policies. On the one hand, as a result of increased labour market compe-
tition and concerns about terrorism, the trend of recent legislation on immigra-
tion points to increasing frontier closure (OECD 1999, 2001). From the other,
there is an increase in regularization: that is, European policies have become
less tight. We have examined these conﬂicting policies by using a real option
approach for migration choice which assumes that the decision to migrate can
be described as an irreversible investment decision (Burda, 1995; Moretto and
Vergalli, 2008). The model has focused on the government’s desired immigrant
stock and the policies adopted to control it. If a government adopts policies
13that go in the direction of tightening admission requirements by imposing quo-
tas on the stock, it is as if it announces its stock target, which becomes perfectly
predictable by potential immigrants. In this case our results agree with the eco-
nomic literature (Bartolini, 1993) and show that potential immigrants may rush
towards the host country because they are afraid of being excluded.
However, if a government is ambiguous about its migration programme, for
example by adopting conﬂicting policies like alternating a tightening of admis-
sion requirements with regularization programs, this makes it diﬃcult for a po-
tential immigrant to predict the true stock target. In this case, we have shown
that the government may be able to delay the mass entry of immigrants by im-
proving its control over migration inﬂows (quotas). If this is the case then the
counterbalancing immigration policies used by European countries are not para-
doxical. They may be useful in indirectly delaying migration waves. Moreover,
if certain governments have unstable majorities, that probably is expressed in
counterbalancing migration policies, the migration inﬂow may become smooth
regardless of the particular policy adopted, but also as a consequence of this po-
litical ambiguity. Furthermore, if a goverment’s aim is to delay entry migration
waves, it can control it by causing noise on information relating to the limit on
immigration stock. In conclusion, there exists a third policy between the two
policies adopted (tightening or reducing the rules for legal immigration): that
is on alternation of tightening and reduction which may facilitate control over
entry.
14A Proof of proposition 1
A family of solutions of (5) is given by:
V (θ,n,N)=A(n,N)θ
γ + B (n,N)θ
β + ˆ V (θ,n) (18)





λ(λ − 1) + αλ − ρ =0with 1 <β<
ρ
α and A(n,N) and B(n,N)
are the two families of integration constants; ˆ V (θ,n) is chosen as the discounted













Because the probability of entry tends to zero as θ tends to zero, one boundary
condition is that lim
θ→0







in the text. The coeﬃcient B (n,N) can be determined by using the following
suitable set of boundary conditions:
1. First, by competitive pressure, the value-matching condition requires the
value of being entered is equal to the entry cost K at θ = θ
∗ (n), i.e., in




2. Second, as long as each individual rationally forecasts the future develop-
ment of the whole market and new entries by competitors at the optimal




3. Third, on (6) for n = N<¯ N, yields (8) and B(N,N)=0 .



















This smooth pasting condition states that either each individual exercises his/her
entry option at the level of θ at which the value is tangent to the entry cost, i.e.,
Vθ (θ
∗,n,N)=0 , or the optimal trigger θ
∗(n) does not change with n. While
the former means that the value function is smooth at entry and the trigger is
a continuous function of n, the latter indicates that an individual would beneﬁt
from marginally anticipating or delaying his/her entry decision. In particular if
Vθ (θ
∗,n,N) < 0 it means that the value of migrating is expected to increase if
θ drops. On the contrary if Vθ (θ
∗,n,N) > 0 means that an individual would
expect to make losses versus a future drop in θ. In both situations (23) is
satisﬁed by imposing ∂θ∗
∂n =0 .

















ρ−α > 0, then (24) cannot hold at n = N.T h e r e -
fore, it must be (25) that holds at n = N and by (21):
θ




Now, deﬁne n∗ as the largest n ≤ N that satisﬁes (24). For all n∗ ≤ n ≤ N,
we have
∂θ∗(n)
∂n =0 , so that all immigrants in the range [n∗,N] must enter at
θ
∗(N). In addition, since for the range n<n ∗ (24) holds, applying this to the


















=( ρ − α)
K
u(N)
Let us now demonstrate the uniqueness of n∗. First, by B (N,N)=0 ,a t
N, V(θ,N,N) equals the discounted income stream with beneﬁt ﬁxed at u(N):




Then, to obtain B(n,N), substitute (20) into (22): Bn(n,N)=−(θ
∗)
1−β u0 (n)/(ρ−
α) and integrating between n and N,g i v e s :
Z N
n












β (ρ − α)
£
uβ (N) − uβ (n)
¤
< 0 (30)
with limn→N B (n,N)=0 −. Substituting (30) into (23), we can deﬁne the










uβ (N) − uβ (n)
¤
(31)
with H (N) > 0.I fH is still positive for a N−y (where y may be inﬁnitesimally
small), with π∗
θ∗ = u(N) we ought to obtain dθ∗
dn =0 . This procedure continues
until we obtain y∗ (deﬁned by n∗ = N − y∗) such that H (n∗)=0 . Let us take











βuβ−1 (N − y)u0(N − y) (32)
=






∗ )1−ββuβ−1 (N − y) − 1
¸
=
u0 (N − y)
ρ − α
£
(u(N))1−ββuβ−1 (N − y) − 1
¤
=









Q.E.D. (Quod erat demonstrandum) if y increases (moving from N to 0)
t h e r ee x i s t sav a l u eo fn∗ (i.e. y∗) such that H (n∗)=0 .
B Proof of Proposition 2.
With uncertainty over stock N, equation (30) becomes:
E (B (n)) =
π∗1−β
β (ρ − α)
"Z ¯ N
n












which is negative because it is worth uβ (n) >u β (N) for any N>n .Further-
more, the limit of E (B (n)), yields:
lim
n→ ¯ N
E (B (n)) =
π∗1−β
















β (ρ − α)
£
uβ (n) − uβ (n)
¤
=0 −
which is consistent with (11).28


























ρ−α > 0 which requires that dθ∗
dn =0 29.
For the uniqueness of n∗∗, assuming that E
¡
H
¡ ¯ N − y
¢¢
> 0 so that dθ∗
dn =0
and the optimal trigger is π∗
θ∗ = u, we need to show that d
E(H( ¯ N−y))
dy < 0.
Substituting ¯ N − y into (34), we get:
E(H












¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dx
1 − F( ¯ N − y)





















−uβ ¡ ¯ N − y
¢
f( ¯ N − y)(1 − F( ¯ N − y) −
R ¯ N
¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))2
+βuβ−1 ¡ ¯ N − y
¢
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f( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y)
−
R ¯ N
¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))2 + βuβ−1 ¡ ¯ N − y
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(1 − F( ¯ N − y))
−
R ¯ N
¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf(∞−y)
























uβ ¡ ¯ N − y
¢
f( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))
−
R ¯ N
¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))2
⎤
⎦ < 0
T h e r et h u se x i s t sav a l u en∗∗ = ¯ N − y∗∗ such that E(H (n∗∗)) = 0.
Finally we need to show that n∗∗ <n ∗. To do so we need to show two
conditions:
1. The value of H(N − y) is greater than the value of E[H( ¯ N − y)] for any
y>y ∗.
2. The function (34) increases more rapidily than (31), i.e., the derivative
(32) is greater than (35).
Condition 2 combined with condition 1 implies that the two functions do
not intersect and that there exists a y∗∗ such that E[H( ¯ N − y∗∗)] = 0. For the
ﬁrst condition, stressing the analysis with respect to any point y greater than
y∗, we can show that (34) evaluated at N − y (i.e. assuming N as the upper
limit of the stock) is lower than (31) if and only if:
R N
N−y uβ (x)f(x)dx
1 − F(N − y)
< 0
which follows using the neoclassical properties. For the second condition, com-




E(H (N − y))
dy























              dH(N-y)/d(y)              dE(H(N-y))/d(y) 
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Figure 5: Graphic Solution
19Notes
1We must stress a ﬁrst caveat concerning the deﬁnition of "quota". In SOPEMI Interna-
tional Migration Outlook (2006) "quota" is deﬁned as the share of total immigrants that is
assigned to a particular group. Therefore, for any given group, it quantiﬁes the percentage of
the total stock admitted in a lapse of time.
2"Schäuble-Sarkozy suggested that EU asylum policy should be centralised, that long-term
economic immigration should be managed by quotas and that short-term immigration should
be regulated by temporary visas", Editorial of Intereconomics, (2006).
3In their broadest sense, regularization programs oﬀe rt h o s em i g r a n t sw h oa r ei nac o u n -
try without authorization the opportunity to legalize their status. Irregular migrants, also
referred to as "undocumented," "unauthorized," or "illegal," are deﬁned by most states as
those migrants who have either entered a country legally and then fallen out of legal status –
such as students, temporary workers, rejected asylum seekers, or tourists – or those who have
entered illegally, either by crossing a border undetected or with false documents. In either
case, irregular migrants do not have a legal right to residence in the state to which they have
migrated.
4Bartolini (1993, 1995), develops a general model that considers the investment decision
of decentralized proﬁt-maximizing agents who face investment adjustment costs in a market
with stochastic returns and a limit on aggregate investment. The model is consistent with
equilibrium models of asset pricing under uncertainty but diﬀers from the mainstream assump-
tion of constant investment cost by assuming that, for technological or institutional reasons,
the investment cost is constant only until an investment ceiling becomes binding. At that
point, in fact, Bartolini shows that cost becomes inﬁnite. His paper shows that a competitive
market reacts to this type of externality by generating recurrent runs as aggregate investment
approaches its limit.
5The existence of limits seems to be idiosyncratic with respect to various aspects of the
economic approach. Particularly, it can be used not only to study migration phenomenon, by
also concerning foreign investment or also the adoption of licenses regulating the market. We
can ﬁnd many examples in which bounds assume an important role in the market. Capital
controls are often imposed to prevent a country’s net credit position from exceeding some
acceptable levels; central banks face limits on the amount of foreign reserves that can be
u s e dt oe n f o r c ea ne x c h a n g er a t et a r g e t ;ﬁrms in a fast-growing industry or in a developing
economy may be competing for extended periods for a small number of qualiﬁed managers or
highly skilled workers; entry of ﬁr m si sr e s t r i c t e di nm a n yi n d u s t r i e sb yr e g u l a t i o n sa i m e da t
containing market size or by technological constraints on the use of a scarce resource. Similar
approaches arise for taxi and liquor licences, ﬁshing and costal trade rights, the number of
polluting trade permits or ecolabelling permits (Dosi and Moretto, 2001).
6Indeed, as stressed in the OECD International Migration Outlook (2006), "In practice,
however, the national limits and associated quotas have been less than the numbers requested
by employers and have proven to be signiﬁcantly under actual labour market needs, if the
extent of regularisations of persons with employment contracts is any indication [...] the
regular lack of concordance between the programmed migration levels and labour market
needs meant that in practice, the levels had become almost irrelevant. Employers may well
have become accustomed to a situation in which they could hire outside legal channels with
relative impunity, with a reasonable probability that the hiring would be formally recognised
a few years hence through regularisation".
7The indexes from 1 to 6 were deﬁned by Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (see www.frdb.org
for details) and the index 7 was deﬁned by Hatton (2004).
8"All countries except Greece, [...] denote a tightening in regulations", see Boeri and
Brücker, 2005, page 634.
9We have compiled Table 1 by drawing on European immigration databases and sources.
Table 1 concerns Europe in the geographical sense.
10Table 2 is our elaboration on Jachimowicz et al. (2004, pages 36-40 ) and Sunderhaus,
(2007).
11See Dixit-Pindyck (1994, pag. 253); Bartolini (1993); Moretto (2008) and Moretto and
Vergalli (2008).
2012This means that we take the diﬀerential wages into account. Hence equation (1) is in
line with this deﬁnition, as also shown by other recent papers (Vergalli; 2008; Moretto and
Vergalli, 2008).
13As stressed by Epstein and Nitzan (2006), "empirical evidence from the EU countries
shows that immigration had at most a very small impact on wages and employment oppor-
tunities of natives". Moreover, "most of the evidence on the eﬀect of immigrants on wages
(and employment) for the US is also ambiguous in the sense that some studies show small
positive eﬀects and others small negative eﬀects". In line with this empirical evidence we
study the migration process without taking account of the crossed eﬀect on natives’ wages
and unemployment level.
14On this see Bauer, Epstein and Gang, (2002), Epstein and Gang (2004), Moretto and
Vergalli (2008), and Vergalli (2007).
15In other words, the reserve value u measures the level of "desperation" of the potential
immigrants.
16For details on the process, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pag. 71).
17In this case we assume that the shock is homogeneous for all immigrants. If the shock
were individual-speciﬁc, the model should change by considering the immigrants as they had
diﬀerent skills (i.e., they could perceive diﬀerent wage gaps). The result would be a change of
scale in the trigger levels and a self-selection of immigrants, but the theoretical result would
not change. For more details, see Vergalli (2007), page 12. Therefore, we use a homogeneous
shock as a general model.
18That is, the sum of the instantaneous dividend (beneﬁt) ﬂow and the expected capital
gain equals normal proﬁts (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 185).
19Where Vθ = ∂V
∂θ and Vθθ = ∂2V
∂θ2 .
20That is, the discounted present value of the beneﬁt ﬂows over an inﬁnite horizon starting
from θ (Harrison 1985, p. 44). See equation (19) in the Appendix.
21This condition is familiar in the real option theory with the name of matching value
condition (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
22See condition (23) in the Appendix.
23It is worth noting that the "utility" threshold that triggers migration for individual im-
migrants is identical to that of the individual that correctly anticipates the other immigrants’
strategies. This property, discovered ﬁrst by Leahy (1993), has an important operative impli-
cation; i.e., the optimal migration policy of each individual need not take account of the eﬀect
of rivals’ entry. He/she can behave competitively as if he/she is the last to enter. In other
words, when an individual decides to enter, by pretending to be the last to migrate, he/she is
ignoring two things: 1) He/she is thinking that his/her beneﬁt ﬂow is given by u(n)θ, with n
held ﬁxed forever. Thus, as u0(n) < 0, he/she is ignoring that future entry by other members,
in response to a higher value of θ, will reduce "utility". All things being equal, this would
make entry more attractive for the migrant that behaves myopically. 2) He/she is unaware
that the prospect of future entry by competitors reduces the option value of waiting. That is,
pretending to be the last to migrate, the individual also believes he/she still has a valuable
option of waiting before making an irreversible decision. All things being equal, this makes
the decision to enter less attractive. The two eﬀects oﬀset each other, allowing the migrant
to act as if in isolation (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 291).
24Obviously, a government sets the stock in line with the supply-demand gap of the labour
market. Indeed, "the selection of candidates for immigration can be made by the receiving
country itself [...] In this case, potential immigrants are screened on the basis of certain
characteristic, deemed to contribute to, and facilitate, integration in the host country, such
as [...] having an occupation deemed to be in shortage and having a prior job oﬀer from an
employer in the host country" (Sopemi, 2006, page 114).
The ambiguity concerning the quota can exist when the government adopts confused im-
migration policies. This may be due to many causes: for example, when diﬀerent political
parties alternate in the government of a country, probably expressing diﬀerent and contradic-
tory policies; or when the authority imposes an exacerbation of admission requirements and
regularization programs at the same time.
2125The upper support of the distribution can be set to ˆ N ≤ ¯ N. Without losing generality we
assume that ˆ N = ¯ N.
26This is due to the fact that
d β
β−1
dσ > 0 and
du(n)
dn < 0.
27We concentrate the analysis on the case of an unknown quota. Obviously, we have the
same eﬀect with a known quota.
28Note that limn→∞ E (B (n)) = 0 even if u(n) →u
¯
≥ 0.
29Note that this result always holds for u
¯
> 0, b u ti ti sa l s ot r u ef o ru
¯
≥ 0 by using limit
deﬁnition. In this case for each real number ε>0 inﬁnitesimely small, there exists a value n0




) − E(H (∞)) <ε




) − 0 <ε
If ε → 0 it follows that n0 i st h er i g h tv a l u ew ea r es e a r c h i n g .
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